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Price Asymmetry in the United States Fresh Tomato Market
Napaporn Girapunthong, John J. VanSickle, and Alan Renwick
This paper analyzes pricing relationships between the producer, wholesale and retail levels of the U.S. fresh tomato 
industry. The results indicate that price transmission is unidirectional from producer to retail. There was no asymmetric 
response for the producer-retail price relationship. Asymmetric price response was exhibited between wholesalers and 
both producers and retailers. Retail prices respond more to rising wholesale prices than to falling prices. Wholesales 
prices, however, respond more to declining producer price than to rising producer price. 
in America. For those products where significant 
asymmetry was discovered, he found that price rises 
were not passed on to the same extent as were price 
falls. He suggested a number of possible reasons for 
this, including the perishability of produce, which 
meant that retailers would be unlikely to raise prices 
and risk stock moving more slowly and deterio-
rating. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) undertook a 
detailed study of margins in the U.S. milk sector 
and concluded that there was asymmetry, but in the 
opposite direction to that found for fresh produce 
by Ward. Kinnucan and Forker postulate three 
reasons why pricing asymmetry in the agricultural 
sector may occur: the existence of market power, 
government intervention in the pricing system, and 
differential impacts of shifts in retail demand as 
opposed to producer supply.
Recently, changes in the U.S. fresh tomato 
market have led to higher producer-retail margins. 
Heien (1980) suggested that margins provide useful 
information about price linkages in the marketing 
system for the agricultural sector. Worth (1999) 
showed that higher marketing costs were correlat-
ed with higher producer-retail margins. Marketing 
costs include transportation, labor and packaging. 
The role of retailers also has influenced the pricing 
mechanism, because retailers can independently 
increase retail prices and therefore the producer-
retail margin (Worth 1999). Farmers are concerned 
with two issues in this area (McLaughlin 1995). 
First, producer prices are not fully adjusted when 
retail market prices increase; this results in retailers 
absorbing more revenues at the expense of produc-
ers and consumers. Second, supermarkets may not 
lower prices when producer prices decrease. When 
producer price cuts do not pass through to the con-
sumer, demand remains unchanged. The producers 
concern is that consumers do not receive the benefits 
of falling producer prices when they pay higher pric-
es at the retail level while producer prices decline. 
This results in increased margins for retailers at the 
Girapunthong is a graduate student, Food and Resource 
Economics Department, University of Florida, Gainesville. 
VanSickle is professor, Food and Resource Economics 
Department and Director, International Agricultural Trade and 
Policy Center, University of Florida, Gainesville. Renwick is 
lecturer, Farm Management Department, University of 
Cambridge, UK.
The issue of market structure and the flexibility of 
prices came to the fore at the time of the depres-
sion of the 1930s when classical economists were 
struggling to address the failure of the market as 
evidenced by the high level of unemployment. 
Earlier studies noted that firms in industries char-
acterized by oligopolies tended to change prices less 
frequently than theory might predict. This is known 
as the “administered price hypothesis.” Means’s 
work led to analyses of the relationship between 
structure and pricing, in particular to analyses of 
structure and the speed and extent of changes in 
cost and demand on prices.
A related issue, which is the focus of the em-
pirical sections of this paper, is the relationship 
between market structure and asymmetry in pric-
ing. Asymmetry can be defined as a difference in 
the reaction of firms to cost increases compared to 
cost decreases. Asymmetry clearly has long been a 
feature of economic theory—for example Keynes’s 
theory was in part related to money wages being 
sticky downwards. Asymmetry can be seen to take 
two forms, one relating to the speed of adjustment 
and the other to the extent of adjustment. Industrial 
economists have undertaken a large number of em-
pirical studies with conflicting results.
The issue of asymmetry in pricing has received 
considerable attention in the agricultural economics 
literature (e.g., Ward 1982; Kinnucan and Forker 
1987; Schroeder 1988; Willet, Hansmire, and 
Bernard 1997). Much of this work on asymmetry 
followed the work of Ward, who examined price 
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expense of producers and consumers. Therefore, 
producers are concerned that price transmission and 
structural change in the U.S. fresh tomato industry 
have resulted in market imperfections. Price trans-
mission is an important topic because it provides 
information about the performance of the marketing 
system and changes in market structure.
This paper investigates asymmetric price rela-
tionships among the producer, wholesale, and retail 
levels in the U.S. fresh tomato market. The general 
approach of this paper employs Ward’s (1982) price-
asymmetry model, which is a dynamic model using 
lagged prices. Granger’s causality test is used to 
analyze the direction of causality. The following 
section discusses the fresh tomato industry in the 
U.S. The methodology used in the analysis of the 
U.S. fresh tomatoes is detailed in the third section. 
The fourth section presents the empirical results. 
The final section presents a brief summary in the 
last section.
U.S. Fresh Tomato Industry
Tomatoes are an important agricultural commodity 
in the U.S. because they earn significant cash-crop 
revenues. Almost two-thirds of the fresh-market 
tomato production in the United States comes 
from California and Florida. Domestic production 
totaled nearly 1.7 million tons in 1997, with more 
than 1.2 million tons produced in these two states. 
However, due to location and climate conditions in 
these two regions, they are not in direct competi-
tion with each other. Florida tends to supply most 
of its production during the winter months, while 
California supplies most of its production in the 
summer. Florida’s main competition comes from 
Mexico; Florida and Mexico they supply over 90 
percent of the U.S. winter market (VanSickle et 
al. 1994). The competition between Mexico and 
Florida has its roots in the U.S. embargo of trade 
with Cuba, which up to that time was the major 
import supplier of the U.S. winter fresh-vegetable 
market. The competition has been fierce, often re-
ferred to as the “Great Tomato War,” and has been 
subject to much scrutiny by academics (Schmitz et 
al. 1981; Thompson and Wilson 1997; Van Sickle et 
al. 2003). At present there is a truce in the ongoing 
litigation following the 1996 suspension agreement 
following an anti-dumping case instigated by U.S. 
producers in 1996 (VanSickle 1997). California’s 
competition is more domestic in nature, mainly 
consisting of producers in other states and “back-
yard” production. Increasing competition has also 
come from greenhouse-grown tomatoes, but those 
tomatoes have been judged a different product (U.S. 
ITC 2002). 
Fresh tomato yields have increased slightly since 
1980. Florida yields were highest in 1992, when 
Mexico suffered from severe flooding. This result-
ed in prices being significantly higher for Florida 
producers, allowing them to harvest higher yields 
per acre. However, since 1994, imports of fresh 
tomatoes have increased significantly. Domestic 
producer prices have declined, and there has been 
a reduction in U.S. fresh tomato production. Thomp-
son and Wilson (1997) estimated that less than one 
thousand producers in the U.S. are responsible for 
the vast majority of production. These producers 
are generally well-represented both politically and 
commercially through a number of groups. For 
example, producers in  Florida are represented 
by the Florida Tomato Committee (FTC), the 
Florida Tomato Growers Exchange (FTGE), and 
the Florida Farm Bureau Federation. This degree 
of concentration and organization may suggest that 
producers are in a position of countervailing power 
to the oligopsonistic retailers. However, attempts by 
U.S. producers to gain countervailing power are to 
a certain extent undermined by the availability of 
a ready supply of imports. 
Producers funnel their production through a 
relatively small number of packing houses. The 
shipment of produce is accounted for largely by 
grower-shippers. Thompson and Wilson (1997) 
estimated that nine grower-shippers in Florida ac-
counted for 80 percent of the State’s shipments. 
Competition in this sector appears fierce, with 
grower-shippers operating to increase their supply 
windows by expanding across regions and across 
countries. Co-ordination between shippers and 
producers varies considerably, ranging from loose 
contracts to fully integrated production. 
A feature of the production of field-scale toma-
toes is their susceptibility to climatic variations. In 
Florida, for example, untimely frosts can devastate 
production; this has occurred a number of times in 
recent years. In addition, the tomato war between 
Mexico and Florida has also had an impact on the 
continuity of supplies at certain times. These factors 
must be considered when the pricing relationships 
are examined. In summary, the supply chain for 
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concentration at all levels. However, the degree of 
competition appears to vary considerably. 
Methodology for Empirical Analysis
Price-Asymmetry Model
The fundamental asymmetric model was suggested 
by Tweeten and Quance (1971) and was modified by 
Wolffram (1971) and Houck (1977). These models 
are static models and do not completely explain 
price changes over time. Ward (1982) elaborated on 
the existing dynamic asymmetric model by incor-
porating lagged prices. The attraction of formulat-
ing this empirical study of pricing in the form of 
an asymmetry model is that it will allow a number 
of issues to be investigated simultaneously. These 
include the extent of price transmission, the speed 
of the transmission, and the existence of differences 
in reaction to rising as opposed to falling markets. 
 Prices at one level of the marketing chain are 
related to prices at another by Rt = f(W), where R 
may be the price at the retail level and W the price 
at the wholesale level. The general case is where R 
is related to W through a distributed lag function,




 If asymmetry occurs then αj differs depending 
on whether Wt is less than or greater than Wt-1. Using 
Young’s (1980) framework, the W variable can be 
split into two, one section capturing price rises and 
the other price falls. Equation (1) can be rewritten 
as













(W t-i − Wt-i-1)Z'
t-i ,




(W t-i − Wt-i-1)Z"
t-i ,
1∀ W t-i ≥ Wt-i-1
             Z'
t-i = {  0 otherwise   }, and
1∀ W t-i ≤ Wt-i-1
             Z"
t-i = {  0 otherwise   }.
Equation (2) can be simplified into equation (3) 
by using Gollnick’s derivation.








Here the estimate of α"
j − α'
j gives a direct test of 
the asymmetry condition.
 Polynomial lags can be incorporated into this 
general model. Under the assumption that the peak 
response to a price change is immediate, the use 
of a first-degree polynomial is valid. Letting φj be 
some weighting of the lags, then equation (4) can be 
incorporated into equation (3). This results in only 
four unknown parameters, rather than 2k unknown 
parameters in equation (3).









 In Ward’s model the data used are seasonal in 
nature and the model is developed to take account 
of this. However, continuous data are used in this 
study, which allows us to bypass some of the prob-
lems in estimation. Putting equation (4) into equa-
tion (3) produces a general model for estimating the 
price linkage:




1H4(t)  + εt,
where
             H1(t) = ∑
3
j=0[W(t-j) − W0],
             H2(t) = ∑
3
j=0[W(t-j) − W0]φj ,








where R is the producer price, W is the wholesale 
price, W"   is the falling wholesale price, and εt is a 
random error term. The asymmetric hypothesis tests 
whether price changes at one level are symmetric 
in response to increases and decreases in prices at 
other levels of the market system. If the null hy-
pothesis that retail price response is symmetric to 
both increases and decreases in wholesale prices is 
rejected, then we conclude there is asymmetric be-
havior between wholesale and retail price levels.
 Two further issues need to be resolved before 
estimation can take place: the direction of causality 
and the nature of the lag system to be used. Gener-
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with respect to establishing causality. Either Grang-
er causality tests are used or direction of causality is 
simply assumed. Clearly, the use of empirical tests 
should be preferable, but the validity of these tests 
is subject to considerable debate (see Kinnucan and 
Forker 1987). This relates not only to the fact that 
the results are susceptible to the number of included 
lags, but also to whether filters should be used.
 The choice of lag structure for this study was 
undertaken on the basis that it needed to be flexible 
to allow for possible changes over time. Previous 
studies have used a number of lag structures, includ-
ing Almon and Shiller lags. The polynomial speci-
fication adopted by Ward when analyzing tomatoes 
implicitly assumes that peak effects occur at the 
outset, followed by a smooth decline. Ward chose 
a value for φj which represented a geometric-decay 
function. Different types of lag structures were con-
sidered for this study; however, the function used by 
Ward appeared to fit the data well and was chosen. 
The lag structure chosen was φj = ³√  ¯ j .
Causality
A simple problem in the asymmetric-price model is 
determining whether movements in one variable are 
caused by movements in another. A causality test 
is one approach that answers this problem. There 
are several approaches in which the direction of 
causality can be analyzed; however, the Granger 
causality test is used in this paper. The basic idea 
of Granger (1969) causality theory is to test the null 
hypothesis that changes in one variable are not able 
to predict the other. For example, if the null hypoth-
esis “producer price does not cause wholesale price” 
is examined, the Granger causality test is performed 
by regressing wholesale price on lagged values of 
itself and lagged values of producer prices and also 
regressing wholesale price on lagged values of itself 
as follows:






βiPt-i + εt ,
(7)        W = ∑
m
i=1
αiWt-i + εt .
From these results, an F-test is used to test the 
null hypothesis that lagged producer prices are 
significant in determining wholesale price. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected (not rejected), it implies 
that producer prices do not cause (cause) whole-
sale price. On the other hand, it is necessary to test 
whether wholesale price leads producer price by 
using the same procedure.
 Previous studies have examined the direction 
of causality in the agricultural food industry. For 
example, Gujarati (1995) suggested, “the direction 
of causality may depend critically on the number 
of lagged terms included.” Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998, 244) argued that the causality test should be 
performed with different lag values to make sure 




Market prices are set daily, and producers respond 
to these prices in determining their harvest, packing, 
and shipping schedules. However, given data avail-
ability for the periods necessary to allow examina-
tion of structural changes in the industry, the use 
of monthly data was the only practical possibility. 
Monthly data for producer, wholesale, and retail 
prices for the U.S. fresh tomato industry are used in 
this study. Producer and retail prices are available 
from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and contain price data from January 1960 
through April 1998, a total of 448 monthly obser-
vations. Collection of wholesale prices was more 
problematic. Monthly price data from Chicago and 
New York terminal markets were obtained from the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) in Wash-
ington. A simple average of the two sets of prices 
was taken to represent wholesale prices. It proved 
difficult to collect a meaningful series for this data 
before 1970. Therefore, this analysis is restricted to 
the period from January 1970 to February 1998. 
Causality Results
The estimation of equations (6) and (7) used differ-
ent lags for each of the variables because Pindyck 
argued those tests of causality may be sensitive to 
the lag length. Moreover, Kinnucan and Forker 
(1987) suggest that Granger’s causality test might 
be inconclusive. Davidson and MacKinnon recom-
mend that Granger causality tests should use more 
rather than fewer lags. We used the results of dif-
ferent lags to judge the confidence in the causality 
results. Gujarati (1995) indicates that the direction 
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is not sensitive to the lag length. 
The Granger causality F-tests are summarized 
in Table 1. The results indicate that changes in the 
producer price of U.S. fresh tomatoes clearly led 
changes in wholesale and retail prices. Granger cau-
sality tests for retail-to-wholesale prices and for re-
tail-to-producer prices do not yield strong evidence 
of causality because the results are sensitive to the 
length of the lags used. In other words, the direction 
of causality from retail price to wholesale price and 
from retail price to producer price depends on the 
number of lagged terms used in the model.
Price transmissions for U.S. fresh tomatoes are 
clearly unidirectional from wholesale to retail. 
Furthermore, the results for price linkage from the 
wholesale price to the producer price are incon-
clusive because results are more sensitive to the 
number of lags included. In summary, the Granger 
causality tests suggest that directions of causality 
for U.S. fresh tomatoes are:
where the arrows represent the causal effect.
Price-Asymmetry Results
The asymmetry model must consider both the lag 
length and weight structure. Based on previous 
studies and empirical evidence (Ward and Myers 
1979, 5; Ward 1982; and Willett, Hansmire, and 
Bernard 1997, 657), this study uses the weight-
ing of a first-degree polynomial equal to ³√  ¯ j (for 
j=0,1,2,3,4 months) where j is the lag length. Fol-
lowing Kinnucan and Forker (1987) the lag length 
was determined by adding statistically significant 
lagged variables. Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carmen 
(1990) and Worth (1999) concluded that the maxi-
mum lag length should be 4 months for fresh vegeta-
bles. Greene (1995, 718) reasoned that determining 
the lag length and weight structure simultaneously 
was problematic. The weight structure should be 
arbitrarily picked first and used to select the length 
of the lag, based on the Schwartz criterion.
The parameter estimates of the pricing-asym-
metry models in equation (5) are presented for each 
specific function in Table 2. In general, the signs 
of the estimated parameters were as expected. All 
the significant tests on H1 and H2 (rising effect) 
at 95-percent confidence suggest a price linkage 
in the U.S. fresh tomato market. The significant 
tests on H3 and H4 (asymmetry effect) for both the 
producer-wholesale and wholesale-retail price rela-
tionships suggest that there is significant evidence 
of asymmetry. In contrast, the insignificant tests 
on H3 and H4 for the producer-retail price relation-
ship indicate that there is no evidence to support 
asymmetry between the producer and retail sectors. 
Furthermore, each of the intercepts is positive and 
significant at the five-percent level, indicating the 
range of the marketing margins between the two 
market levels. 
Table 1. F-test for Granger Causality Tests for U.S. Fresh Tomato Market, May 1975–February 
1998.
Market relationship Lag 2 Lag 10
F-statistic F-statistic
Producer → Wholesale 50.94* 10.66*
Wholesale → Producer 8.04* 1.3
Wholesale → Retail 90.38* 14.52*
Retail → Wholesale 1.81 0.97
Producer → Retail 178.18* 34.49*
Retail → Producer 5.82* 1.67
* indicates significantly different from zero at 5 percent level.56   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Girapunthong, VanSickle, and Renwick Price Assymetry in the United States Fresh Tomato Market   57
The cumulative effects are presented in Table 
3. The empirical evidence indicates that the retail 
price response to both increases and decreases in 
producer prices is symmetric, implying that there is 
no significant evidence of market distortion between 
producer and retail markets. The producer-whole-
sale price relationship has positive asymmetry. This 
implies that wholesale prices of U.S. fresh tomatoes 
respond more to declining producer price than to ris-
ing price, which is asymmetric. One possible reason 
wholesalers respond more to price decreases is that 
they are trying to maintain their customer base and 
market share in the wholesale sector. If wholesale 
prices responded more to rising producer prices 
Table 2. Estimated Coefficients for Pricing Asymmetry in the U.S. Fresh Tomato Market between 
May 1975 and February 1998.
Parameter Producer-Retail Producer-Wholesale Wholesale-Retail
C 50.346 22.251 43.556
(15.637)* (9.615)* (12.502)*
H1 1.140 0.976 0.971
(17.713)* (22.840)* (18.470)*
H2 -0.771 -0.667 -0.821
(-9.139)* (-11.916)* (-12.058)*
H3 -0.095 0.212 -0.275
(-0.725) (2.444)* (-2.719)*
H4 0.092 -0.221 0.285
(0.655) (-2.363)* (2.600)*
R2 0.864 0.830 0.871
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.819 0.863
F-test 101.814 78.162 108.253
Number of observations 274 274 274
* significant at the five-percent confidence level.
Note: t-values in parentheses.
Table 3. Asymmetric Price Response for U.S. Fresh Tomato Market.
Relationship Mean price Mean lag Cumulative 
($/pound)      Rising                Falling       Rising              Falling
Producer-Retail Producer = 21.63      0.430                 0.468       1.684               1.615
Producer-Wholesale Wholesale = 31.48      0.4391                0.282       1.550               1.6042
Wholesale-Retail Retail = 69.00      0.125                 0.228       1.100               0.829
1 Mean lag of rising effect is significantly different from falling effect.
2 Cummulative of falling effect is significantly different from falling effect.56   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Girapunthong, VanSickle, and Renwick Price Assymetry in the United States Fresh Tomato Market   57
than to falling prices, wholesalers would jeopar-
dize their customer base, because buyers could buy 
from other wholesalers or use direct-procurement 
contracts. The negative asymmetry at the whole-
sale-retail price level indicates that retail prices 
respond more to rising wholesale prices than to 
falling wholesale prices. In other words, the retail 
prices for U.S. fresh tomatoes increase more in 
response to increases in the wholesale price than 
to similar price decreases in wholesale prices. This 
result is counter to Ward’s (1982) result that retail 
prices tended to reflect more of a wholesale price 
decrease than a wholesale price increase. Ward rea-
soned that rising prices might reduce retail sales and 
increase the incidence of spoilage. However, it has 
been argued by Renwick and VanSickle (1998) that 
better post-harvest handling practices, direct pro-
curement, and extended-shelf-life (ESL) varieties 
have reduced perishability problems. Furthermore, 
they argue that retailers may be exercising market 
power to support this pricing relationship. These 
arguments support the conclusion that responses of 
retail prices to wholesale price increases are quicker 
than the response of retail prices to wholesale price 
decreases.
 McLaughlin (1995) suggested a number of 
possible reasons why retailers may not adjust their 
prices downward in times of oversupply. These re-
late to the perception that consumers will not buy 
more if the price is lowered, either because the fall 
is so small it might not be registered as a fall, or 
even if it is large enough to be noticed it may not 
induce increased sales. In addition, inelastic demand 
for tomatoes suggests that a price cut will lead to a 
fall in revenue for the retailer when price falls, even 
if the good is elastic in demand, perishability still 
places a limit on purchases by consumers. Finally, 
the product is only one of many products sold in the 
store, and pricing needs to be related to an overall 
strategy for the store, including such factors as shelf 
space allocation.
The mean lag shown in Table 3 indicates how 
long, on average, it takes for the effect of a price 
change to be observed. It is an indication of the aver-
age speed of price transmission. Mean lags in this 
study are small, ranging from 0.125 to 0.468. Ward 
(1982) concluded that a small mean lag indicates 
quick decays. In this study, the mean lags related 
to the rising producer price variables are larger 
than are the corresponding mean lags of the falling 
producer-price variables, implying that wholesale 
prices adjust more quickly to falling prices than to 
rising prices at the producer level. However, the 
mean lag of wholesale-retail price changes occurred 
in the opposite direction. 
Conclusion and Summary
This study found unidirectional causality from the 
producer level to the retail level. Producer price led 
both wholesale and retail prices. This indicates that 
price transmissions in the U.S. fresh tomato market 
flow from producer to wholesale to retail levels. 
However, Ward (1982) found the lead linkage from 
wholesale level to both retail and shipping-point 
levels. The results of the analysis suggest that cau-
sality has changed because of structural changes in 
the U.S. fresh tomato market over time. Further-
more, the results of the asymmetric-price-response 
model indicate that wholesale prices respond more 
to falling producer prices than to rising producer 
prices. These results suggest wholesalers compete 
to keep their customer base and market share in the 
wholesale sector. Therefore, wholesale prices adjust 
more quickly to falling prices than to rising prices 
at the producer level. Retail prices of U.S. fresh 
tomatoes respond more to rising wholesale prices 
than to falling wholesale prices. This result differs 
from Ward, who found retail prices reflect more 
wholesale-price decreases than wholesale-price 
increases. Ward reasoned that rising prices might 
decrease retail sales and increase the incidence of 
spoilage. However, Renwick and VanSickle (1998) 
suggested that better post-harvest handling prac-
tices, direct procurement, and extended-shelf-life 
(ESL) varieties reduce the perishability problem. 
These changes may be contributing to retail prices 
increasing more quickly in response to wholesale 
price increases than to wholesale price decreases. 
Finally, retail price responses to increases and de-
creases in producer prices were symmetric. This 
indicates that there is no significant evidence of 
market distortion between these two markets.
 Finally, knowing price linkages among mar-
ket levels will aid in the evaluation of the potential 
impacts of agricultural policy on producers and 
consumers. For example, supporting programs to 
help reduce the cost of production may not benefit 
consumers if retail prices do not decrease because 
of decreasing producer prices. The results obtained 
from price-transmission and price-asymmetry tests 
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this study, the existence of asymmetric behavior 
between producer-wholesale and wholesale-retail 
price relationships carries important policy implica-
tions. They imply that there is significant evidence 
indicating market distortions in these relationships. 
In addition, the causality test suggests prices are set 
at the producer level and passed on to wholesale and 
retail levels. These results suggest that producers 
can use market strategies such as direct procurement 
to avoid problems with price transmission in the 
vertical market system, thereby offsetting some of 
the problems associated with market power.
 These results are significant for understanding 
the pricing behavior between market segments in 
the produce industry. The results of this analysis 
are dependent on the assumption of stationary 
transaction costs. It should be noted that some of 
the results may be due to shocks occurring in that 
sector which are not identified in this analysis. Use 
of scanner data and collection of marketing-sector 
cost data could be used to augment these analyses 
and provide further insight into price transmission 
in the fresh produce sector.
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